

Implementation of Continuous and Transparent User Identity Verification for Secure Internet Services

Pruthvi M P^{#1}, Tharunya B^{#2}, Vinutha J S^{#3}, Varsha Varadarajan^{#4}, and Prathibha B S^{*5}

[#] Student, Dept. of Information Science, NIE College, Karnataka, India

^{*} Assistant professor, Dept. of Information Science, NIE College, Karnataka, India

Abstract— In recent years, fingerprint recognition technique is the dominant technology in the biometric market. A number of recognition methods have been used to perform fingerprint matching. The Straightforward matching between the fingerprint pattern to be identified and many already known patterns would not serve well due to its high sensitivity to errors (e.g. various noises, damaged fingerprint areas, or the finger being placed in different areas of fingerprint scanner window and with different orientation angles, finger deformation during the scanning procedure etc.). In this paper, we proposed effective fingerprint matching based on two methods i.e., Method 1(pattern-based), Method 2(minutia-based). This paper presents extra patterns and features of fingerprint and show the matching between two fingerprints.

Index Terms— Fingerprint matching; pattern-based method; minutiae-based method

I. INTRODUCTION

Session management in distributed Internet services is traditionally based on username and password, explicit logouts and mechanisms of user session expiration using classic timeouts. Emerging biometric solutions allow substituting username and password with biometric data during session establishment, but in such an approach still a single verification is deemed sufficient, and the identity of a user is considered immutable during the entire session. Additionally, the length of the session timeout may impact on the usability of the service and consequent client satisfaction. This paper explores promising alternatives offered by applying biometrics in the management of sessions. A secure protocol is defined for perpetual authentication through continuous user verification. The protocol determines adaptive timeouts based on the quality, frequency and type of biometric data transparently acquired from the user.

SECURE user authentication is fundamental in most of modern ICT systems. User authentication systems are traditionally based on pairs of username and password and verify the identity of the user only at login phase. No checks are performed during working sessions, which are terminated by an explicit logout or expire after an idle activity period of the user. Security of web-based applications is a serious concern, due to the recent increase in the frequency and complexity of cyber-attacks; biometric techniques [1] offer

emerging solution for secure and trusted authentication, where username and password are replaced by biometric data. However, parallel to the spreading usage of biometric systems, the incentive in their misuse is also growing, especially considering their possible application in the educational sectors [2]. Such observations lead to arguing that a single authentication point and a single biometric data cannot guarantee a sufficient degree of security [7]. In fact, similarly to traditional authentication processes which rely on username and password, biometric user authentication is typically formulated as a “single shot”, providing user verification only during login phase when one or more biometric traits may be required. Once the user’s identity has been verified, the system resources are available for a fixed period of time or until explicit logout from the user. This approach assumes that a single verification (at the beginning of the session) is sufficient, and that the identity of the user is constant during the whole session. For instance, we consider this simple scenario: a user has already logged into a security-critical service, and then the user leaves the PC unattended in the work area for a while.

II. RELATED WORK

To timely detect misuses of computer resources and prevent that an unauthorized user maliciously replaces an

Authorized one, research work is keeping going from long back still misbehavior and phishing not been avoided as of our survey we done work and those are:

L. Montecchi et al[3]; proposed Biometric authentication systems verify the identity of users by relying on users distinctive traits, like fingerprint, face, iris, signature, voice, etc. Biometrics is commonly perceived as a strong authentication method; in practice several well-known vulnerabilities exist, and security aspects should be carefully considered, especially when it is adopted to secure the access to applications controlling critical systems and infrastructures. In that research they performed a quantitative security evaluation of the CASHMA multi-biometric authentication system, assessing the security provided by different system configurations against attackers with different capabilities. The analysis is performed using the ADVISE modeling formalism, a formalism for security evaluation that extends attack graphs; it allows to combine

information on the system, the attacker, and the metrics of interest to produce quantitative results. The obtained results provide useful insight on the security offered by the different system configurations, and demonstrate the feasibility of the approach to model security threats and countermeasures in real scenarios.

III. PROBLEM DEFINITION:

Once the user's identity has been verified, the system resources are available for a fixed period of time or until explicit logout from the user. This approach assumes that a single verification (at the beginning of the session) is sufficient, and that the identity of the user is constant during the whole session. In existing, a multi-modal biometric verification system is designed and developed to detect the physical presence of the user logged in a computer.

IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM:

In this paper presents a new approach for user verification and session management that is applied in the context aware security by hierarchical multilevel architectures (CASHMA) system for secure biometric authentication on the Internet. CASHMA is able to operate securely with any kind of web service, including services with high security demands as online High-stakes assessments for typically standardized tests used for the purposes of accountability, and it is intended to be used from different client devices, e.g., smartphones, Desktop PCs or even biometric kiosks placed at the entrance of secure areas. Depending on the preferences and requirements of the owner of the web service, the CASHMA authentication service can complement a traditional authentication service, or can replace it. Our continuous authentication approach is grounded on transparent acquisition of biometric data and on adaptive timeout management on the basis of the trust posed in the user and in the different subsystems used for authentication. The user session is open and secure despite possible idle activity of the user, while potential misuses are detected by continuously confirming the presence of the proper user.

V. MAIN OBJECTIVES:

- Our approach does not require that the reaction to a user verification mismatch is executed by the user device (e.g., the logout procedure), but it is transparently handled by the CASHMA authentication service and the web services, which apply their own reaction procedures.
- Provides a tradeoff between usability and security.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION:

System Model: In this module, we create the System model to evaluate and implement our proposed system. CASHMA can authenticate to web services, ranging from services with strict security requirements as assessment tool services to services with reduced security requirements as forums or social networks. Additionally, it can grant access to physical secure areas as a restricted zone in an airport, or a military

zone (in such cases the authentication system can be supported by biometric kiosk placed at the entrance of the secure area). We explain the usage of the CASHMA authentication service by discussing the sample application scenario, where a user *u* wants to log into an online study service. "User ID" refers to the identity of the user obtained from the application for the purpose of logging into the assessment tool facility provided by the Server. "Login Password" is a unique and randomly generated password known only to the User/Student, which can be changed by the user to his/her convenience. This is a means of authenticating the user ID for logging into Assessment Tool. "Transaction Password" is a unique and randomly generated password known only to the User, which can be changed to his/her convenience. This is a means of authentication required to be provided by the customer for putting through the interaction in his/her/their/its accounts with students through assessment tool. While User ID and Password are for valid access into the internet application, giving valid Transaction Password is for authentication of transaction/requests made through internet.

Authentication Server: In online Assessment System as with traditional online tools that educators use to evaluate, measure, and document the academic readiness, learning progress, skill acquisition, or educational needs of students. assigning methods, security is a primary concern. Server will take every precaution necessary to be sure your information is transmitted safely and securely. The latest methods in Assessment Tool system security are used to increase and monitor the integrity and security of the system.

The Server maintains the functionality:

- o Users/Student Details
- o Activation of Beneficiary
- o Interaction Details
- o Activate Blocked Account

CASHMA Certificate: In this module, we present the information contained in the body of the CASHMA certificate transmitted to the client by the CASHMA authentication server, necessary to understand details of the protocol. Time stamp and sequence number univocally identify each certificate, and protect from replay attacks. ID is the user ID, e.g., a number. Decision represents the outcome of the verification procedure carried out on the server side. It includes the expiration time of the session, dynamically assigned by the CASHMA authentication server. In fact, the global trust level and the session timeout are always computed considering the time instant in which the CASHMA application acquires the biometric data, to avoid potential problems related to unknown delays in communication and computation.

Continuous Authentication: A secure protocol is defined for perpetual authentication through continuous user verification. The protocol determines adaptive timeouts based on the quality, frequency and type of biometric data transparently acquired from the user. The use of biometric authentication allows credentials to be acquired transparently, i.e., without explicitly notifying the user or requiring his/her interaction, which is essential to guarantee better service

usability. The idea behind the execution of the protocol is that the client continuously and transparently acquires and transmits evidence of the user identity to maintain access to a web service. The main task of the proposed protocol is to create and then maintain the user session adjusting the session timeout on the basis of the confidence that the identity of the user in the system is genuine.

VII. CONCLUSION

We exploited the novel possibility introduced by biometrics to define a protocol for continuous authentication that improves security and usability of user session. The protocol computes adaptive timeouts on the basis of the trust posed in the user activity and in the quality and kind of biometric data acquired transparently through monitoring in background the user's actions. Some architectural design decisions of CASHMA are here discussed. First, the system exchanges raw data and not the features extracted from them or templates, while crypto-token approaches are not considered; as debated in Section 3.1, this is due to architectural decisions where the client is kept very simple. We remark that our proposed protocol works with no changes using features, templates or raw data. Second, privacy concerns should be addressed considering National legislations. At present, our prototype only performs some checks on face recognition, where only one face (the biggest one resulting from the face detection).

REFERENCES

- [1] S.Z. Li and A.K. Jain, *Encyclopedia of Biometrics*. first ed., Springer, 2009.
- [2] T.F. Dapp, "Growing Need for Security in Online Banking: Biometrics Enjoy Remarkable Degree of Acceptance,," *Banking & Technology Snapshot*, DB Research, Feb. 2012.
- [3] L. Montecchi, P. Lollini, A. Bondavalli, and E. La Mattina, "Quantitative Security Evaluation of a Multi-Biometric Authentication" University of Florence, 50134 Firenze, Italy -2012
- [4] L. Montecchi, N. Nostro, A. Ceccarelli, G. Vella, A. Caruso, and A. Bondavalli. "Model-based evaluation of scalability and security tradeoffs: A case study on a multi-service platform". Volume 310, 5 January 2015, Pages 113-133.
- [5] U. Uludag and A.K. Jain. "Attacks on Biometric Systems: A Case Study in Fingerprints". Article in *Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering* 6 • January 2004.
- [6] O. Sheyner, J. Haines, S. Jha, R. Lippmann, and J.M. Wing. "Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs". *Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P02)*
- [7] S. Kumar, T. Sim, R. Janakiraman, and S. Zhang, "Using Continuous Biometric Verification to Protect Interactive Login Sessions," *Proc. 21st Ann. Computer Security Applications Conf. (ACSAC '05)*, pp. 441-450, 2005.
- [8] A.K. Jain, A. Ross, and S. Pankanti, "Biometrics: A Tool for Information Security," *IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 125-143, June 2006.
- [9] L. Allano, B. Dorizzi, and S. Garcia-Salicetti, "Tuning Cost and Performance in Multi-Biometric Systems: A Novel and Consistent View of Fusion Strategies Based on the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)," *Pattern Recognition Letters*, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 884-890, 2010.